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EDITORIAL
Mana motuhake ā-raraunga: dataﬁcation and social science
research in Aotearoa
Social practices, interactions and relations are increasingly being turned into data, driven by
technologies that enable new methods of data accumulation, digitisation, integration and
manipulation (Taylor and Broeders 2015; Couldry and Yu 2018; Mann and Daly 2019).
This ‘dataﬁcation’ is not only transforming social relations, it is also reshaping social
science through the generation of datasets that open up new avenues for research and meth-
odological development (van Dijck 2014) and generating debate about the relationships
between data, digitalisation, ethics and human wellbeing (boyd and Crawford 2012; Mittelstadt
and Floridi 2016; O’Neil 2016; Eubanks 2018).
Dataﬁcation is playing out in Aotearoa New Zealand with rapid developments in data-
sharing, linkage and the integration of large datasets for operational and research purposes.
While the Government has distanced itself from its predecessor’s social investment approach
(Boston and Gill 2017), there remains a focus on data-driven decision-making that includes
the use of integrated data, operational algorithms and predictive risk modelling (Stats NZ
2018). The ﬂagship of integrated data is the Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI), a major
research database managed by Stats NZ that links microdata about individuals and households
from the census, surveys, government agencies and an increasing number of NGOs. The de-
identiﬁed data are available under the ‘ﬁve safes’ framework for research that is ‘for the public
good’ and that ‘improves) the outcomes of New Zealanders’ (Stats NZ 2019a). Recent research
includes projects that focus on the causes and consequences of criminal activities; the health
consequences and costs of child poverty; and the development of models to predict suicide
and self-harm risk (Stats NZ 2019a). Applications to use IDI data are reviewed internally by
Stats NZ. Their process does not require approval from an ethical review committee, nor exter-
nal peer review from subject experts (Gulliver et al. 2018).1 Outside of Stats NZ, there is no
standard approach to the ethical use of IDI data across the education and research sectors.
Health and Disability Ethics Committees, established under the New Zealand Public Health
and Disability Act to ensure that health and disability research meets ethical standards, do
not currently require ethical approval for the use of IDI data in health research projects.
Some universities require that researchers submit ethics approval to use secondary datasets,
such as the IDI, while others do not. The IDI is also used by researchers working in govern-
ment departments, think tanks and independent consulting companies that do not have
internal ethics processes.
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Social licence and Census 2018
For some researchers, the absence of ethical oversight over the IDI might be seen to absolve
them from engaging with issues arising from dataﬁcation that include consent, trust,
beneﬁts, harm and risk. Our view is that the lack of mandatory ethics should prompt
more, not less, scrutiny and reﬂection about how integrated data are produced and used.
Take, for example, the ‘social licence’ that Stats NZ depends on in order to undertake its
data integration activities (Nielsen 2018). Gulliver et al. (2018) have traced the concept of
social licence to the work of sociologist Everett Hughes who ‘explored the conditions
under which society was prepared to aﬀord professions permission to adopt practices that
violate accepted social norms without incurring social sanction’ (p. 59). Social licence has
been most widely used in extractive sectors, such as mining and forestry, where industry
practices can result in harm to the environment or communities. In those contexts, organ-
isations can be said to have a social licence to operate when their conduct and practices meet
societal or community expectations. Stats NZ deﬁnes its social licence as the permission it
has to make decisions about the management and use of the public’s data without sanction
(emphasis added, Nielsen 2018).
One might ask, to what extent does Stats NZ have a social licence to integrate individual and
household data and make it available for statistical and research purposes, including social
science research? Recent survey research commissioned by the agency suggests that its
social licence is far from assured. Of the 2,000 survey respondents, only 23% knew Stats NZ
reasonably or very well, and only one third viewed the agency positively or very positively.
Of those who knew at least a little about Stats NZ or had done the census in the last 5
years (n = 1,938), less than half had moderate or high trust in Stats NZ to:
. use personal information to beneﬁt society (47%);
. keep personal information safe (49%);
. be open and transparent in how personal information is managed and used (42%); and,
. take account of public views in decision making relating to personal data (36%, Nielsen
2018).
The number of Māori respondents was too small (n = 301) to permit disaggregated results
but research carried out by others strongly suggests that knowledge of and trust in Stats NZ
would be signiﬁcantly lower among Māori (Tuhono Trust 2017; Gulliver et al. 2018).
The controversial 2018 Census brings the issue of social licence into sharp relief. To plug
major data holes in the census, Stats NZ has drawn extensively on individuals’ information
from other government datasets. In short, it has devised a method to locate missing individuals
in other government data in order to add them into the census dataset (for more details, see
Stats NZ 2019b, 2019c, 2019d). This method diﬀers dramatically from previous census practice
and bears little resemblance to the understanding of the census process that most New Zeal-
anders had going into Census 2018. The ‘administrative enumeration’ add-ons equate to 11
per cent of the total approximately 4.7 million people in the census dataset (Stats NZ 2019c).
In a previous paper, we estimated that up to 30% of Maori were missed by the Census 2018
enumeration (Kukutai and Cormack 2018). A recent report by Stats NZ conﬁrmed that the
interim collection response rate2 from individual census forms was just 68.2% for Maori
nationally and 65.1% for Paciﬁc peoples (Stats NZ 2019d). Both are far below the interim
national response rate of 83.3%. In addition, of the total number of (ethnic) Maori counted
in the census dataset, 71% were sourced from individual census forms, 6% were from
‘partial responses’ (for which ethnic aﬃliation still had to be sourced elsewhere, see fn 3)
and 23% from other government data (i.e., individuals’ 2013 census record, birth registration,
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Ministry of Education tertiary enrolment etc.). In other words, the use of other government
data to plug census holes for Māori far exceeded the 11% for the total population.
In addition to the IDI data, information provided directly from the Ministry of Defence and
Department of Corrections was also used to complete the census dataset. This too is a major
departure from previous census practice whereby prisoner data were only sourced through pris-
oners’ census forms. According to a Stats NZ report, ‘The administrative data that the Ministry
of Defence and Department of Corrections provided was a list of everyone in defence establish-
ments or prisons across New Zealand on census night’ (Stats NZ 2019b). These records were
compared to the information collected through the 2018 Census forms to establish who had
already been included in the census data, and who had not. Individuals who were missing
from the census were then added in using the records provided directly by the institutions3.
There is an obvious tension here in that the people who have been disproportionately
subject to the use of data undertaken on the basis of purported social licence are the least
likely to have a high degree of trust in Stats NZ. In the case of Māori, this trust may have
been further eroded by Stats NZ’s announcement in April that it cannot provide oﬃcial iwi
data from the 2018 Census due to data quality issues (Stats NZ 2019c). The implications for
iwi of this failure are grave given that the census is the only oﬃcial dataset that reliably collects
iwi aﬃliation data (Kukutai and Cormack 2018). While one might argue that the lack of col-
lective action over Census 2018 reﬂects Māori (and New Zealanders’) tacit acceptance of Stats
NZ’s social licence, social scientists have good reason to be sceptical. The more likely expla-
nation is that most people simply do not know how their data are being used for secondary
purposes in this new integrated data environment.
Seeing like a state
Census 2018 illustrates how marginalised groups that have been the ‘subjects’ of data ‘surveil-
lance’ activities (Tufekci 2014) can be disproportionately impacted by data integration activities,
but also lack a meaningful mechanism to have their views included in decision-making that
aﬀects them (O’Neil 2016; Eubanks 2018). In his inﬂuential book Seeing like a state, social scien-
tist James Scott traces the ways in which governments have attempted to impose schemas on
their populations that make them more legible (Scott 1998). However, these schemas often
fail to recognise complex forms of local knowledge and can work directly against the populace’s
interests. In a big data context, Taylor and Broeders (2015) propose that this ‘seeing’ also occurs
through the power that the state gains from amassing large amounts of data about people, whom
may lack an awareness of how their data are being collected, integrated and used. There are mul-
tiple ways for ‘data misspeak’ to occur, especially when the focus is on identifying sub-popu-
lations for the purpose of intervening. Data points are not self-evident facts but reﬂect the
social, political and cultural contexts in which the data are collected, analysed and interpreted
(boyd and Crawford 2012). In Aotearoa NZ, changes in the data ecosystem means the capability
for the government to ‘see like a state’ is now more profound than ever.
In this regard we see continuities with historical data practices (re)produced as part of colo-
nialism. Data have long been used in colonial nation-states to count, classify, monitor, and
construct accounts of Indigenous peoples (Ittmann et al. 2010). Couldry and Mejias (2019)
argue that the concept of ‘data colonialism’ provides a useful frame for thinking about the
current big data environment ‘ … not as a mere metaphor, nor as an echo or simple continu-
ation of historic forms of territorial colonialism, but to refer to a new form of colonialism dis-
tinctive of the twenty-ﬁrst century’ (p. 337).
Current data practices also tend to draw on the same extractive logics as those that under-
pin colonialism and capitalism, especially in relation to natural resources (Couldry and Mejias
2019). These extractive logics also permeate the NZ data landscape, reﬂected in taglines such as
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Stats NZ’s declared vision to ‘unleash the power of data to change lives’4 and ‘unlocking the
economic and social value of data across New Zealand’s data ecosystem’ (New Zealand
Data Futures Forum n.d.). Given that inequities in the distribution of power and privilege
have long animated the social sciences, obvious questions arise about who is doing the
unleashing and unlocking, on whom, for what purpose, and according to whose values?
Drawing on the work of decolonialisation scholar Aníbal Quijano, Couldry and Mejias
(2019) identify the fundamental problem with data colonialism as ‘ … its vision of totality’
that excludes other ways of understanding data relations. A re-visioning of data relations
and practices is, therefore, essential to interrupt data colonialism.
The potential of Indigenous and Māori data sovereignty
Māori data sovereignty (MD-Sov), and Indigenous data sovereignty (ID-Sov), provide an
alternative vision of data practices that are grounded in Indigenous ways of being and
knowing and self-determining aspirations (Kukutai and Taylor 2016; Carroll Rainie et al.
2017). MD-Sov refers to the inherent rights and interests that Māori have in relation to the
collection, ownership, and application of Māori data (digital or digitisable information or
knowledge that is about or from Māori people, language, culture, resources or environments)
(Cannataci 2018; Te Mana Raraunga 2018; UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy
2019). ID-Sov is supported by Indigenous peoples’ inherent rights of self-determination and
governance over their peoples, country (including lands, waters and sky) and resources as
described in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP). Implicit in MD-Sov is the desire for data to be used in ways that support and
enhance the collective wellbeing and self-determination of Indigenous peoples – a sentiment
emphasised by Indigenous NGOs, communities and tribes (FNIGC 2016; Hudson et al. 2016).
In practice ID-Sov means that Indigenous peoples need to be the decision-makers around how
data about them are used or deployed.
In contrast to current dominant data practices, MD-Sov grounds data practices within rela-
tional ontologies that recognise the inherent dignity and humanity of all peoples. In this sense
it provides a framework to transform relationships with data in ways that not only protect
against harm for Māori, but also provide transformative data practices for a greater good.
MD-Sov, alongside ID-Sov and movements for data justice, prompt us to broaden our
focus on the technological possibilities or challenges of dataﬁcation, to explore the deeper
questions about the types of data relations being (re)produced, how these are shaping
broader social relations, and in whose interests they are operating (Dencik et al. 2019).
MD-Sov and ID-Sov also challenge taken-for-granted concepts that are grounded in Anglo-
centric worldviews such as the primacy of individual privacy.
MD-Sov principles developed by Te Mana Raraunga, the Maori Data Sovereignty Network,
provide a useful starting point for operationalising what transformative data practices for col-
lective beneﬁt might look like (Te Mana Raraunga 2018, see Appendix A). Framed within the
six Māori values of rangatiratanga, whakapapa, whanaungatanga, kotahitanga, manaakitanga
and kaitiakitanga, the 16 principles provide guidance on how to engage with issues such as data
control, jurisdiction, disaggregation, accountabilities, guardianship and consent. Returning to
the 2018 Census example, principles relating to control and consent are particularly relevant,
especially as they relate to decision-making and the signiﬁcant use of administrative data for
Māori. Thus, Principle 5.2 states that ‘Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) shall underpin
the collection and use of all data from or about Māori. Less deﬁned types of consent shall be
balanced by stronger governance arrangements’. Principle 1.1 states that ‘Māori have an
inherent right to exercise control over Māori data and Māori data ecosystems’. Clearly, a
MD-Sov principle-based approach to Census 2018 would produce a very diﬀerent process
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than that undertaken to date. At the very least, it would require a mechanism for robust data
governance. Last year Stats NZ committed to a Treaty-based Māori approach to data govern-
ance across the oﬃcial data system as a way forward (Stats NZ n.d.), but it is unclear how far
that has progressed.
It is also useful to consider open data initiatives in Aotearoa NZ given that ID-Sov has ‘chal-
lenged dominant discourses in open data, questioning current approaches to data ownership,
licensing, and use’ (Rainie et al. 2019). If we consider the open government data programme5,
approaches could be informed by principles relating to restrictions (6.3 Restrictions: ‘Māori
shall decide which Māori data shall be controlled (tapu) or open (noa) access)’, and guardian-
ship (6.1: ‘Māori data shall be stored and transferred in such a way that it enables and
reinforces the capacity of Māori to exercise kaitiakitanga over Māori data’).
MD-Sov principles challenge the universality of data practices and relations that have
become naturalised in our societies, calling attention to their partial and contingent nature.
Rather than promoting a framework that can simply be layered over an establishedWesternised
data system, MD-Sov (re)imagines data relations that are transformed, decolonised, and indi-
genised. We have focused here on data harms and protective mechanisms but also acknowledge
the tremendous potential of data to generate individual and collective beneﬁt (see, for example,
MD-Sov principle 4.1). The MD-Sov approach has the potential to beneﬁt all groups, particu-
larly those most marginalised within state systems of data surveillance.
The need to attend to these issues is becoming more pressing given the expansion of well-
being measurement approaches requiring increasingly granular data, a more permissive inter-
agency data sharing environment and well-documented problems of algorithmic bias (O’Neil
2016; Eubanks 2018). The boundaries of what are considered acceptable data collection and
use also continue to be stretched. Examples include Stats NZ’s ‘population density’ pilot
that uses anonymised aggregated data from telco companies to develop commercial products
that track real time movements of people within cities and regions (Moir 2019), and recent
media reports of the potential commercialisation of the IDI by charging for a ‘value-add
service’.6 Social science in Aotearoa NZ has much to contribute to a critically informed under-
standing of how processes of dataﬁcation are reshaping human relationships and societal
structures and institutions, and to hold those in power to account.
Notes
1. The IDI application process is currently being revised to include some Treaty and tikanga
considerations.
2. This rate is based on the number of individual forms received, divided by the number of
people who should have been counted (using a dual system estimation benchmark). Stats
NZ also computed an alternative ‘new’ response rate which includes partial information
(at least two or more of name, date of birth, meshblock) from an individual, dwelling or
household summary form. These rates are not comparable with previously computed
rates. The interim Maori response rate using this new method was 74.3% and 73.5% for
Paciﬁc peoples. The ﬁnal response rates will be published once the results from the Post Enu-
meration Survey have been processed in early 2020.
3. The report notes: “Administrative enumerations that were not already in the census were
sourced from the records within these datasets”. A subsequent report by Stats NZ (2019d)
conﬁrms that, “Information on ethnicity has also been provided by the Ministry of
Defence and Department of Corrections”.
4. See: https://www.stats.govt.nz/about-us/
5. https://www.data.govt.nz/about/open-data-nz/
6. https://www.stuﬀ.co.nz/national/politics/114331277/inside-stats-nzs-gaping-money-hole
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Appendix A: Māori Data Sovereignty Principles
01 Rangatiratanga | Authority
1.1 Control.Māori have an inherent right to exercise control over Māori data and Māori data
ecosystems. This right includes, but is not limited to, the creation, collection, access, analysis,
interpretation, management, security, dissemination, use and reuse of Māori data.
1.2 Jurisdiction. Decisions about the physical and virtual storage of Māori data shall enhance
control for current and future generations. Whenever possible, Māori data shall be stored in
Aotearoa New Zealand.
1.3 Self-determination.Māori have the right to data that is relevant and empowers sustainable
self-determination and eﬀective self-governance.
02 Whakapapa | Relationships
2.1 Context. All data has a whakapapa (genealogy). Accurate metadata should, at minimum,
provide information about the provenance of the data, the purpose(s) for its collection, the
context of its collection, and the parties involved.
2.2 Data disaggregation. The ability to disaggregate Māori data increases its relevance for
Māori communities and iwi. Māori data shall be collected and coded using categories that
prioritise Māori needs and aspirations.
2.3 Future use. Current decision-making over data can have long-term consequences, good
and bad, for future generations of Māori. A key goal of Māori data governance should be to
protect against future harm.
03 Whanaungatanga | Obligations
3.1 Balancing rights. Individuals’ rights (including privacy rights), risks and beneﬁts in
relation to data need to be balanced with those of the groups of which they are a part. In
some contexts, collective Māori rights will prevail over those of individuals.
3.2 Accountabilities. Individuals and organisations responsible for the creation, collection,
analysis, management, access, security or dissemination of Māori data are accountable to
the communities, groups and individuals from whom the data derive.
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04 Kotahitanga | Collective beneﬁt
4.1 Beneﬁt. Data ecosystems shall be designed and function in ways that enable Māori to
derive individual and collective beneﬁt.
4.2 Build capacity.Māori Data Sovereignty requires the development of a Māori workforce to
enable the creation, collection, management, security, governance and application of data.
4.3 Connect. Connections between Māori and other Indigenous peoples shall be supported to
enable the sharing of strategies, resources and ideas in relation to data, and the attainment of
common goals.
05 Manaakitanga | Reciprocity
5.1 Respect. The collection, use and interpretation of data shall uphold the dignity of Māori
communities, groups and individuals. Data analysis that stigmatises or blames Māori can
result in collective and individual harm and should be actively avoided.
5.2 Consent. Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC)1 shall underpin the collection and use
of all data from or about Māori. Less deﬁned types of consent shall be balanced by stronger
governance arrangements.
06 Kaitiakitanga | Guardianship
6.1 Guardianship.Māori data shall be stored and transferred in such a way that it enables and
reinforces the capacity of Māori to exercise kaitiakitanga over Māori data.
6.2 Ethics. Tikanga, kawa (protocols) and mātauranga (knowledge) shall underpin the protec-
tion, access and use of Māori data.
6.3 Restrictions.Māori shall decide which Māori data shall be controlled (tapu) or open (noa)
access.
1 https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/ publications/2016/10/free-prior-
and-informed-consent-an-indi genous-peoples-right-and-a-good-practice-for-local-commu-
nities-fao/
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